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Abstract. The concept of “cultural identity” has gradually replaced such discredited 
concepts as “race”, “ethnicity”, even “nationality” in the conservative political discourse of 
recent decades which conceives, represents and performs culture as a closed system with 
clear-cut boundaries which must be defended from contamination. 
The article employs the theories of Derrida and Lotman as useful tools for 
deconstructing this understanding of cultural identity, which has recently become an 
ideological justification for socio-political conflicts. In fact, their theories spring from a 
thorough critique of the kind of internalizing self-enclosure which allowed Saussure to 
delimit and describe langue as the object of linguistics. The article identifies and compares 
the elements of this critique, focusing on Derrida’s and Lotman’s concepts of “mirror 
structure”, “binarism”, “numerousness”, “textuality” and “semiosphere”.  
An understanding of mediation emerges which is not reducible to any kind of definitive 
acquisition, thereby frustrating the pretences of identity, constantly dislocating and 
deferring any attempt at semiotic self-enclosure. My comparison suggests that Lotman’s 
“translation of the untranslatable” (or “dialogue”) and Derrida’s différance can be con-
sidered analogous descriptions of this problematic kind of mediation. The (de)construc-
tive nature of culture, as described by Lotman and Derrida, challenges any attempt to view 
cultural formations as sources of rigid and irreducible identities or differences. 
 
 
This article represents the first systematic attempt to compare Juri Lotman’s 
(later) thinking with Jacques Derrida’s theory of différance. The risks associated 
with this undertaking become apparent when one considers that the two 
thinkers never (as far as I can tell) referred to each other or were even 
acquainted with each other’s work. In other words, their texts offer neither 
explicit guidelines nor subtle hints to assist in the development of a 
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comparative analysis. This is probably why it is unlikely to encounter the name 
of Derrida in the field of “Lotman studies” or the name of Lotman in the field 
of “Derrida studies”. 
In the literature on Lotman’s later theory of the semiosphere, references to 
the analogy (explicitly emphasized by Lotman himself) with Vernadsky’s 
theory of the biosphere, Prigogine’s description of biological processes (see, for 
instance, Mandelker 1994, Sánchez 1999, Aleksandrov 2000) and Bakhtin’s 
thought (see Shukman 1989, Reid 1990) have recently been integrated with 
comparisons with Peirce’s semiotics and related developments in biosemiotics 
and global semiotics (e.g. Sebeok 1998; Merrell 2001; Kotov 2002; Kull 2005). 
In the introduction to her monograph on Lotman, Edna Andrews stresses the 
need to recognize that “the works for which Lotman is best known in the West 
are not necessarily the most indicative of his mature thought” (Andrews 2003: 
xiv) and tries to “update” Lotman by positioning his theory within the broader 
semiotic perspective elaborated by thinkers such as Peirce, Jakobson and 
Sebeok.  
A recent collection of articles, Lotman and Cultural Studies: Encounters and 
Extensions (Schönle 2006; see also Schönle 2002), signals an important shift in 
the contextualization of Lotman’s later thinking, opening it to further 
comparison with important thinkers in cultural studies and poststructuralism: 
Bakhtin, Benjamin, de Certeau, Foucault, Gramsci, Jameson, Kristeva, etc. My 
research partakes in the spirit of this innovative approach to Lotman studies 
and embodies the idea, stated by Andreas Schönle and Jeremy Schine in their 
introduction to the collection, that Lotman’s later thinking not only needs a 
new interpretation, but also further “extension” and integration, which would 
facilitate its potentially heuristic encounter with contemporary currents of 
thought within the humanities and social sciences – poststructuralism and 
cultural studies in particular (Schönle, Schine 2006: 7).1 
As for Derrida, providing an overview of the huge amount of literature on 
the concept of différance would be a Herculean task. It is enough to state that 
the main thinkers referenced in this kind of research – such as Heidegger (see 
Donkel 1992, for instance), Levinas, Nancy, Deleuze (e.g. May 1997), 
Foucault (see Boyne 1990; Lucy 1995: 48–71, for example), Lyotard and 
                                                          
1  In any event, it is also difficult to find any reference to Derrida in Schönle’s collection. 
Only Amy Mandelker mentions his name in connection with the possible influence of a 
Jewish background on Lotman’s (and Derrida’s) thinking (see Mandelker 2006: 72). 
 Challenging identity 321 
 
Rorty (e.g. Gasché 1995)2 – are almost completely absent from academic 
articles and books on Lotman’s later work. However, even if recent writing on 
Derrida sometimes fails to mention this, the fundamentals upon which the 
elaboration of the concept of différance was established were developed by a 
theorist to whom Derrida himself often referred, the same theorist who created 
the framework along which Lotman’s work in particular and semiotics in 
general would develop. Obviously, I am referring to Ferdinand de Saussure. 
And it is from Saussure that I will shortly begin my comparison between 
Derrida and Lotman.  
Before I proceed, I would like to make explicit the extra-theoretical 
background of this research and how I position myself within it. As is often (if 
not always) the case when undertaking research, the motivation for my 
comparison of Lotman and Derrida is not merely theoretical curiosity, but a 
concern for what is happening around us. The concept of “cultural identity” 
has gradually replaced such discredited means of identification as “race”, 
“ethnicity”, and even “nationality” in political, sociological and public language 
in recent decades. Nevertheless, the cultural identity discourse has inherited to 
some degree the political function of these terms and has become a 
fundamental instrument of the conservative shift that has hegemonized 
Western politics in our times. A clear example of this understanding of cultural 
identity is provided by the recent European polemics on integration and 
immigration policies. Chancellor Angela Merkel has revived the notion of 
Leitkultur as opposed to postwar Germany’s multicultural path to integration. 
President Nicholas Sarkozy promoted a national discussion with the aim of 
                                                          
2  David Wood writes that a “Society of Friends of Difference would have to include 
Heraclitus, Nietzsche, Saussure, Freud, Adorno, Heidegger, Levinas, Deleuze, and Lyotard 
among its prominent members” (Wood 1988: ix). Other approaches are more specific: 
Todd May, for example, suggests that “the articulation of an adequate concept of 
difference” should be considered as “the overriding problem that occupies recent French 
thought”, which implies the generation associated with the terms “poststructuralism” and 
“postmodernism”: Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, Irigaray, Kristeva, Levinas, Lyotard, 
Lacoue-Labarthe, LeDoeuff, Nancy (May 1997: 1–2). It is interesting that according to 
May’s approach, the chronology of the “theory of difference” coincides with that of Tartu-
Moscow cultural semiotics; the writings of the generation of French thinkers mentioned 
above started to appear in the late 1960s, and the publication of the first issue of Sign 
Systems Studies  (Труды по знаковым системам) in 1964 can be considered as the impetus 
which led Tartu–Moscow scholars to the new theoretical framework known as “cultural 
semiotics”.            
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determining “what it means to be French”, thus setting the boundaries of 
French cultural identity. Prime Minister David Cameron criticizes the “passive 
tolerance” of recent years and predicates the need for an active, “muscular” 
liberalism which would be the basis for a stronger British identity. We can of 
course consider these kinds of attitude as crude demagogical attempts to garner 
a political profit from the xenophobic feelings spreading all over Europe. In any 
event, we must recognize that the basis and consequences of these attitudes are 
more profound than the results of an election. In contemporary politics, 
cultural identity is conceived and described as a closed system of values with 
clear-cut boundaries that have to be defended from contamination. This 
concept of identity supports the idea that the main socio-political conflicts of 
our times are actually based on culture.3  
Even the multiculturalist position, which can be viewed as a reaction to the 
risks of cultural conservatism, seems to presuppose an unquestioned 
conception of cultural identity, in which the emphasis is placed on the need to 
accept and promote the peaceful co-existence of different cultural identities 
within the same social space. The result has been that, rather than becoming a 
means of critiquing conservative conceptions of cultural identity, multi-
culturalism is regarded as a kind of project which should unite people of good 
will. The lack of critical reflection thus weakens the multiculturalist position 
and makes it difficult to dispute Merkel’s declaration of the death of multikulti 
or Cameron’s demonization of “state multiculturalism” as responsible for the 
rise of Islamic extremism in Western countries.4 The claim that conflicts 
inevitably emerge when people living in the same social space possess different 
value systems is merely a platitude. But should we therefore agree with Merkel 
and Cameron that, in order to ensure security and peace, all differences should 
be assimilated into the dominating culture (Leitkultur)? And furthermore, is 
such assimilation achievable; is a univocal cultural identity even possible?  
Postcolonial and cultural studies have recently challenged clear-cut notions 
of cultural identity by introducing the concept of “hybridity”, which blurs the 
boundaries between “one’s own” and “the foreign”, the “dominating” and the 
                                                          
3  This idea has often been expressed as the Huntingtonian “clash of civilizations”: “It is 
my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be 
primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and 
the dominating source of conflict will be cultural” (Huntington 1993: 22).   
4   For a critique of multiculturalism from an anti-conservative position see Žižek (2011: 
43–53). 
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“dominated”. The hypothesis that by adopting the colonizer’s cultural patterns, 
the colonized inevitably contaminates and transforms those patterns, clearly 
contradicts the presumed autonomy and primacy of a hegemonic Leitkultur.5       
To return to Lotman and Derrida, I will explore in the following another 
way of questioning the notion of (cultural) identity. The question is not simply 
how existing cultural identities interact to engender a third, hybrid identity, nor 
how persons with different cultural identities might live together peacefully. 
My comparison of Lotman and Derrida will lead to the conclusion that the 
function of culture and, more generally, of human communication should not 
be primarily understood in terms of identity.  
Therefore, this article is intended to challenge the notion of “identity” from 
a theoretical point of view. It also means that my research was conceived as a 
thorough critique of the conservative cultural identity discourse to which I 
have briefly referred above. Theoretical work in any empirical field is always an 
intervention into that field. Tartu–Moscow scholars already pointed to this 
inevitably double nature of theoretical constructions in their Theses on the 
Semiotic Study of Culture (1973): “any scientific idea may be regarded as an 
attempt to cognize culture and as a fact of its life through which its generating 
mechanisms take effect” (Ivanov et al. 1998: 60).6 
The following comparison could not and is not meant to be a close reading 
of Derrida and Lotman. My intention is to establish a general framework for 
more detailed analyses by describing what could be considered as a kind of 
isomorphism between the general logic of Lotman’s and Derrida’s approaches. 
The central concepts of their theories arise, in my opinion, from similar 
problematic horizons and also point to similar ways of positioning oneself in 
relation to them.  
 
                                                          
5  As Arjun Appadurai observes, “at least as rapidly as forces from various metropolises 
are brought into new societies they tend to become indigenized”, being “absorbed into 
local political and cultural economies” (Appadurai 1996: 42, 32). We should add that 
today, immigrants to Western countries also “foreignize” indigenous “forces” by 
introducing other issues and accents. Postcolonial scholars sometimes use the concept of 
“creolization”, which also plays a central role in Lotman’s cultural semiotics, as a synonym 
for hybridity.  
6  This is why, as Peeter Torop explains, “the dynamism of culture as a research object 
forces science to search for new description languages but the new description languages in 
turn influence the cultural dynamics as they offer new possibilities for self-description” 
(Torop 2009: xxxiii). 
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The inside and the outside:  
impelling Saussurean separations 
As I have already mentioned, a preliminary analysis of Derrida’s and Lotman’s 
works reveals that, in spite of the huge differences between the intellectual 
environments in which their work developed, the two thinkers share what 
could be called the starting point of their theoretical enterprise. This common 
starting point can be said to be Derrida’s and Lotman’s critical rethinking of the 
fundamentals of Saussurean semiology.7 In essence, we could say that Derrida 
and Lotman developed the Saussurean notion of difference into an (anti-
structuralist) critique of the internalizing self-enclosure, which allowed 
Saussure to delimit and describe langue as a system separate from parole.  
Saussure established the fundamentals of his linguistics (and semiology) by 
means of a theoretical process I have elsewhere described as a “procedure of 
totalization” (see Monticelli 2008). The definition of a linguistic system is, in 
other words, a question of delimitation – the setting of relevant boundaries 
which allows an actually partial aspect of language to coincide with the object 
of study “in its entirety” (Saussure 2000: 8; see also Derrida 1997: 33–34). A 
consequence of this delimitation of boundaries is the opening8 of an internal 
space (langue) – structured and intelligible according to an intrinsic law – 
separate from external space (parole) – a series of disparate, heterogeneous 
elements which do not immanently conform to the constraints of the systemic 
law. Saussure insisted on the essential need to keep the internal and external 
points of view distinct, and to never “blur the boundaries which separate the 
two domains” (Saussure 2000: 20–23). 
                                                          
7  This is quite clear for Lotman as a “semiotician” (see also Lotman 2000: 4–6). 
However, as Andrews observes in the introduction to the English translation of Culture and 
Explosion, “Lotman wanted to present his ideas as fundamental not only to a semiotic 
approach to language, culture and text, but as more general concepts that are applicable 
within a variety of methodological approaches” (Andrews 2009: xx). Conversely, for 
Derrida as a “philosopher” or “(French) thinker”, it was of the greatest importance to re-
frame the entire Western philosophical tradition within the new horizon opened up by 
semiological research in the field of language and signification; in Of Grammatology he 
writes that “our historico-metaphysical epoch must finally determine as language the 
totality of its problematic horizon” (Derrida 1997: 6).  
8  “[…] the opening of the field […] also amounts to a delimitation of the field” (Derrida 
1982: 140). 
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Structuralism extended the procedure of totalization that Saussure had 
applied to the study of language to the study of other sign systems and texts.9 
The so-called “semiotic reductionism” can be described as the delimiting 
separation of a given semiotic space (structure, system, code or text) and its 
transformation into an isolated, discrete whole with its own distinct 
boundaries. This separation is assumed to make possible the exhaustive study 
of the meaning and identity of the phenomena that belong to the internal 
space, while disregarding external elements as irrelevant. It is from this 
methodological standpoint that it becomes possible to place (as did Derrida) 
structuralist semiology into a broader theoretical context, and to discern the 
areas where it resonates with Western metaphysics.  
Derrida and Lotman called into question Saussure’s procedure of totalization, 
the separation, closeness and interiority of linguistic and other semiotic 
systems.10 As Lotman programmatically stated in the opening lines of Culture 
and Explosion, “the fundamental questions relating to the description of any 
semiotic system are, firstly, its relation to the extra-system, to the world which lies 
beyond its borders...” (Lotman 2009: 1). In Of Grammatology, Derrida criticized 
Saussure’s (and many others’) understanding of writing (écriture) as “the external 
representation of language”, which is not essentially related to the internal 
linguistic system; similarly to Lotman, he contested this separation and 
highlighted the complex interplay between the internal and the external: “The 
outside bears with the inside a relationship that is, as usual, anything but simple 
exteriority. The meaning of the outside was always present within the inside, 
imprisoned outside the outside, and vice versa” (Derrida 1997: 35). The process 
of deconstruction does not “destroy structures from the outside” (as it is often 
simplistically described), but rather erodes the borders of the structure by 
generating short-circuits between the internal and the external.11  
                                                          
9  Lotman enumerates as the bases of “traditional structuralism” systemic closeness, self-
sufficiency, separation, and isolation in time and space (see Lotman 2009: 13). 
10  I agree with Andreas Schönle and Jeremy Shine when they describe Lotman’s later 
works as attempts “to go beyond the Saussurean foundations of his earlier semiotics” 
(Schönle, Shine 2006: 7).  
11  In Positions Derrida described grammatological thought as “the thought for which there 
is no sure opposition between outside and inside” (Derrida 1981: 12). Derrida’s work has 
often been understood as completing the transition from the metaphysics of interiority – 
“the era of consciousness” – to the privileging of exteriority – the “era of textuality” (see 
Strozier 1988, for instance). Instead of this opposition between the inside and the outside, 
I am emphasizing the Derridean problematization of the relationship between them. 
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An initial examination of the strategies followed by Lotman and Derrida in 
their respective attempts to contest the Saussurean delimiting separation 
between the outside and the inside reveals an important discrepancy between 
the two thinkers’ approaches, which we have to keep in mind in the following 
discussion. Describing the discrepancy from a general and abstract point of 
view, we could say that Lotman concentrated on phenomena at the systemic 
level; heterogeneity, asymmetry, binarism and the related notion of translation 
are applicable to the relationships between complex systems such as texts, 
languages, or other sign systems. In his theory of différance, Derrida seemed to 
focus mainly on single elements such as signs, signifiers and signifieds. In any 
event, the kind of isomorphism that I have mentioned above and will now 
describe emerges between these different levels of analysis. This is why my 
work is an attempt not only to compare but also to reciprocally integrate 
Lotman’s and Derrida’s theories.12 
 
 
Rethinking totality: semiosphere and textuality 
As noted above, Saussure described the linguistic system (langue) as a “self-
contained whole” (Saussure 2000: 10), the closure and autonomy of which are 
achieved on the basis of a separation between an internal and an external space 
and the consequent exclusion (“disregard” is the word Saussure used) of a 
series of “facts of language (langage)”. Hence the paradox: the linguistic system 
emerges as a whole – “Langue, seen from an internal point of view is… 
PERFECTLY WHOLE” (Saussure 2006: 57) – only insofar as another 
presupposed totality (“all manifestations of human language”) is dis-
membered, set apart, liquidated. This paradox is also the reason why critiquing 
Saussurean delimiting separation led both Lotman and Derrida to 
reconceptualize the relationship between unity and totality, the part and the 
whole, limitedness and openness. The basis for this revision is what Derrida 
called “numerousness” in “Dissemination” and Lotman termed “(at least) 
                                                          
12  In any case, the difference in Lotman’s and Derrida’s levels of analysis has to be 
conceived as a theoretical tendency not as a systematic and exclusive choice. For instance, 
if the above-mentioned refusal of Saussurean separations is generally presented by Lotman 
in systemic terms, we can also find in his texts formulations of this refusal which relate to 
single elements such as signs: “The idea that the starting point of any semiotic system is not 
the simple isolated sign (word), but rather the relation between at least two signs causes us 
to think in a different way about the fundamental bases of semiosis” (Lotman 2009: 172).       
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binarism”: totality is not one, but at least two; not unity, but numerousness or 
plurality. 
Thus, for Lotman, “the smallest functioning semiotic mechanism” cannot be 
a singular system like Saussure’s langue, but must consist of “at least two semiotic 
mechanisms (languages) which are in a relationship of mutual untranslatability, 
yet at the same time being similar since by its own means each of them models 
one and the same extrasemiotic reality” (Lotman 1997: 10; see also Lotman 
2009: 4–6). Lotman described this paradoxical situation as a union of symmetry-
asymmetry that he called a “mirror structure”, producing “untranslatable, yet 
similar reflections” (Lotman 1997: 10). Insofar as extrasemiotic reality is in itself 
inapprehensible, we are left from the outset with the play of its reflections 
between reciprocally untranslatable languages. In Of Grammatology, Derrida 
used a similar strategy to introduce his critique of Saussure’s “phonologo-
centrism” and marginalization of writing. At a crucial point in his argument, we 
find a passage that resembles Lotman’s “mirror structure”: 
 
representation mingles with what it represents, to the point where [...] one thinks as 
if the represented were nothing more than the shadow or reflection of the 
representer. […] In this play of representation the point of origin becomes 
ungraspable. There are things like reflecting pools, and images, an infinite reference 
from one to the other, but no longer a source, a spring. There is no longer a simple 
origin. For what is reflected is split in itself and not only as an addition to itself of its 
image. The reflection, the image, the double, splits what it doubles. The origin of 
the speculation becomes a difference. What can look at itself is not one; and the law 
of addition of the origin to its representation, of the thing to its image, is that one 
plus one makes at least three. (Derrida 1997: 36) 
 
According to Lotman, the mirror structure reveals that what was thought of as 
originary unity and self-identity is actually characterized by difference from the 
very beginning:  
 
The dialogue partner is located within the “I” as one of its components or, 
conversely, the “I” is part of the constitution of the partner […]. The need for the 
“other” is the need for the origin of the self; a partner is needed insofar as he/she 
presents a different model of the familiar reality, a different interpretation of the 
familiar text. (Lotman 1990: 409; my translation – D. M.) 
 
It comes as no surprise, therefore, that Lotman also employed, on the systemic 
level, Derrida’s numerical idea of splitting. Lotman used it to conceptualize the 
relationship between similarity and difference, on the one hand, and between 
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the whole and the part, on the other. In fact, the constitutive dualism of any 
semiotic mechanism is transposed and reproduced within each of its parts, 
each active language being continuously bisected and itself constituting a 
binary system (Lotman 2002: 2650–2659). The situation therefore arises in 
which being part of a whole – a binary system – implies being a whole in itself – 
a binary system (Lotman 1997: 12). And conversely, the fact that any whole is 
constituted of (at least) two parts also means that any whole is also part of a 
bigger whole. Transformation into a part requires completion or supple-
mentation of the whole (Derrida 2000: 56), but this makes separation and self-
enclosure impossible.  
This is why Lotmanian binarism cannot be reduced to the structuralistic 
notion of binary opposition. On the contrary, the binary maintains within the 
semiotic continuum an irreducibly “plural” character, functioning as a 
mechanism for the multiplication of languages: “binarism, however, must be 
understood as a principle which is realized in plurality since every newly-
formed language is in its turn subdivided on a binary principle” (Lotman 2000: 
124). Here, as in the quotation from Derrida, one plus one makes (at least) 
three. This is, in my opinion, the fundamental intuition at the heart of 
Lotman’s conception of the semiosphere. If “three” is the mediating number, 
mediation leads here to unbounded proliferation – an “avalanche”, as Lotman 
writes (see Lotman 2002: 2654), or “dissemination” in Derrida’s terms.  
The earlier Tartu–Moscow theory of language and culture as primary and 
secondary modelling systems, respectively, which focuses on the relationship 
between separate semiotic systems and external reality, should be reconsidered 
in the light of Lotman’s later theory of the semiosphere, which focuses instead 
on the position of different systems along a semiotic continuum. Even if a 
semiotic system remains, in Lotman’s words, “a generator of structurality”, 
which transforms “the open world of realia into the closed world of names” 
(Lotman, Uspenskij 2001: 42), this is possible only because any semiotic 
system, culture and language presupposes an open semiosphere in which the 
play of reflection (binarism, asymmetry and heterogeneity) constantly dis-
places and reconfigures the relationships between semiotic units and realia. 
Derrida similarly concluded that writing is not an irrelevant externality in 
respect to the interiority of language, but, on the contrary, that (archi-)writing 
as an open field of textuality “comprehends” and “goes beyond the essence” of 
language (Derrida 1997: 7). It is in this context that we should interpret the 
famous and ubiquitously quoted claim of Derrida: “there is nothing outside the 
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text” (il n’y a pas de hors-texte) (see, for instance, Derrida 1997: 163). It would 
be incorrect to understand textuality as an internal space, a self-enclosed 
totality in terms of Saussure’s langue. On the contrary, (archi-)writing as a 
space of textuality should be understood neither as absolute exteriority nor 
total interiority, but precisely as the impossibility of conclusively separating 
and delimiting an interiority from exteriority. In my opinion, the same can be 
said for Lotman’s semiosphere.13 
In Derrida’s theory of archi-writing/textuality and Lotman’s theory of the 
semiosphere, the focus shifts from (structuralistic) totalization, by which a 
given semiotic system is made into a separate whole with clear-cut boundaries, 
to an infinite and open totality, which “comprehends” any system and makes it 
vulnerable to the effects of numerousness and plurality. Laying the foundations 
for this revisited conception of totality, Lotman’s binarism/plurality and 
Derrida’s numerousness function as instruments for the deconstruction of 
originary unity – such as the Saussurean “natural bond” between the signifier 
and the signified (on which Derrida focused), or the Saussurean self-enclosure 
of the linguistic system (to which Lotman turned his attention).14  
 
 
The construction of identity: metalinguistic  
self-description and the transcendental signified 
Although Lotman and Derrida established that any semiotic space must be 
understood in terms of plurality and heterogeneity rather than oneness and 
sameness, they nevertheless analyzed the mechanisms by which our culture has 
tried to construct unity and self-identity out of originary plurality/nume-
rousness. This can be described in Derrida’s terminology as an attempt to 
“exorcize” the mirror structure. Once again, Derrida focused on a single 
element that he called the “transcendental signified”, while Lotman identified a 
systemic unit that he termed the “metalanguage of self-description”.  
                                                          
13  Peeter Torop writes about a “new understanding of holism” which emerges from the 
Lotmanian opposition of a “communicating whole” to a “delimited whole” (Torop 2005).   
14  It is important to highlight an interesting difference between Lotman’s theory of the 
semiosphere and Derrida’s theory of textuality. If Derrida’s space of textuality coincides 
with the “total structure” of archi-writing, which is based on discreteness/spacing, 
articulation, and demotivation, for Lotman, this kind of structuring force enters within the 
semiosphere into dialogue/collision with another kind of structuring force that is based on 
iconicity, continuality, and motivation. 
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According to Derrida, the onto-theological exorcism of the mirror structure 
occurs through “reference to the meaning of a signified thinkable and possible 
outside all signifiers” (Derrida 1997: 73). Such a “transcendental signified” is 
that which “in and of itself, in its essence, would refer to no signifier, would 
exceed the chain of signs, and would no longer itself function as a signifier” 
(Derrida 1981: 19–20). The transcendence of the transcendental signified is 
therefore due to its particular position in respect to all the other elements of the 
structure – as Derrida explained, “the centre is paradoxically within the 
structure and outside it” (Derrida 2004: 352), and is the only element of the 
structure which, while governing that structure, escapes “structurality” and is 
safe from the play of reflection and numerousness. This is why resorting to a 
transcendental signified brings about a centralization, hierarchization and 
delimitation of the boundaries of the field of textuality, the “chain of signs” 
which is thus given a stable foundation, origin, and end.  
According to Lotman, the semiotic space is centred and structured into a 
homogeneous totality by a process in which one of the languages of the 
semiotic space acquires a dominant position (see Lotman 1990: 254–255). 
This language thus becomes a metalanguage which enables the different 
systems of the semiotic space to be counted as one. It is the “nuclear structure” 
and occupies the “core” of the semiotic space, but it possesses a different status 
from all the other systems of that space; it functions as “the transcendental unity 
of self-consciousness” (employing a Kantian concept adopted by Lotman). 
The semiotic space is thus organized into a homogeneous structural whole, in 
which the plurality of systems is reduced to a “single, definitive truth” (Lotman 
1990: 254–255; Lotman, Uspenskij 2001: 65). Lotman wrote of “the 
idealization of a real language” which leads to an “ideological self-portrait” or 
“mythologized image” of culture as opposed to “real cultures” and “real texts” 
which are always characterized by oscillation between at least two different 
systems (Lotman 1990: 408; 2000: 129; Lotman, Uspenskij 2001: 132–133).  
The metalanguage of self-description is subtracted from the play of 
reflection and differentiation, and is also, in Derrida’s terminology, an “outside-
within” of the semiotic space. Anyway, for Lotman this transcendence is not 
firstly attached to presumably originary meanings, but described as a “central 
codifying mechanism”, functioning, one might say, as a generator of trans-
cendental signifiers which are imposed as universal and homogenizing forms of 
expression onto the various contents circulating within the semiotic space 
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(Lotman 1990: 407–408; 2000: 222; Lotman, Uspenskij 2001: 39–68).15 In 
Marxian terminology, we could describe the metalanguage of self-description 
regulating the communicative exchange within the homogenized semiotic 
space as a kind of “general equivalent” (see Marx 1967)16 which establishes and 
warrants the principle of “universal translatability” (see Lotman 1985: 89) 
within the internal space, and excludes from the latter all elements which 
cannot be translated into the metalanguage. Derrida attributed the same 
function to the transcendental signified: “the theme of a transcendental 
signified took shape within the horizon of an absolutely pure, transparent and 
unequivocal translatability” (Derrida 1981: 20). In his Specters of Marx, he 
characterized this kind of translation in the following way: 
 
Guaranteed translatability, given homogeneity, systematic coherence in their 
absolute forms, this is surely (certainly, a priori and not probably) what renders […] 
the other impossible […]. There must be disjunction, interruption, the 
heterogeneous if at least there must be, if there must be a chance given to any “there 
must be” […]. (Derrida 2006: 42)  
 
Lotman wrote in the same vein of the risks of metalinguistic self-description 
exhausting the reserve of indeterminacy of a given semiotic space, which may 
thus lose its dynamism, become inflexible and incapable of further 
development (Lotman 1990: 266; 2000: 134). 
 
 
Deconstructing identity: dialogue and différance 
The transcendental and idealizing centring of semiotic space (the space of 
textuality) described by Lotman and Derrida transforms the plurality that 
constitutes any semiotic system into a closed unity, a totality with clear-cut 
boundaries: the Derridean “play of the signifiers” is effaced by the 
                                                          
15  Still, the “central-codifyng mechanism” strongly relates to and leads to transcendental 
signification also in Lotman’s case: “The law-forming centre of culture, genetically deriving 
from the primordial mythological nucleus, reconstructs the world as something totally 
ordered, with a single plot and a supreme meaning” (Lotman 2000: 162).   
16  Marx described in his genealogy of exchange value and money the mechanism by which 
an immanent and real element of a given set becomes a transcendental and ideal equivalent of 
all other elements of that set: “Gold is money with reference to all other commodities only 
because it was previously, with reference to them, a simple commodity” (Marx 1967: 70). 
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transcendental signified; the Lotmanian heterogeneity and pluralism of the 
semiotic space is effaced by metalinguistic self-description. The mediation 
effected by the transcendental signified and the metalanguage of self-
description resembles the Hegelian logic of Aufhebung in which the three (or 
the third) no longer functions as an index of plurality but becomes the point of 
access to the unity of the one.    
Lotman’s conception of dialogue (or translation of the untranslatable) and 
Derrida’s concept of différance present us with a process of mediation which 
maintains plurality and numerousness, is not reducible to stable or definitive 
sublation/acquisition and frustrates the pretence of self-identity by constantly 
dislocating and counteracting any attempts at semiotic closure.  
According to Lotman, the most fundamental mechanism of the semio-
sphere is translation, but there are different types (and different topoi – places) 
of translation which correspond to different kinds of mediation. The meta-
language of self-description functions as a universal translational device at the 
centre of the semiotic space and univocally determines its boundaries: on the 
inner side, what is translatable, and on the outer side, what cannot be 
translated. The other possibility Lotman considered was to conceive of the 
boundary rather than the centre as the place of translation. This implies the 
redefinition of the notion of boundary.  
Connecting (or translating) boundaries cannot be viewed as mono-
dimensional lines of separation; they are, on the contrary, multidimensional, 
complex spaces which Lotman also described as “bilingual belts” (Lotman 
1999: 16). From the standpoint of metalinguistic (transcendental) self-
description, the boundary serves to separate the semiotic space from what is 
external to it. From the point of view of its “immanent mechanism”, the 
boundary as a bilingual belt connects different semiotic systems and opens 
them to an interplay which Lotman defines as “dialogue” or “translation in 
cases of untranslatability”, where translatability is not guaranteed (recalling the 
quotation from Derrida), but hindered or even impossible from the perspective 
of the metalanguage of self-description.17  
                                                          
17  This is why Lotman’s conception of “dialogue” is not reducible to the kind of wishful 
thinking that often accompanies the understanding of multiculturalism as a project to be 
undertaken. Lotman’s characterization of dialogue as a kind of impossible but inevitable 
translation reveals the difficulties and problems (including possible conflicts) with this 
kind of mediation. It is therefore not surprising that he chooses the word “tension” (which 
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Translation of the untranslatable, which clearly differs from the universal 
translatability described above, crosses the boundary between different 
semiotic systems. Whereas metasystemic translation is expected to be 
complete, exhaustive, and the only correct and possible option, eliminating all 
untranslatable residues by relegating them outside the boundaries of the 
semiotic space, intersystemic translation (translation in the bilingual 
periphery) is always difficult, inadequate and partial.  This implies that different 
translations are all equally correct (or equally incorrect) and that each 
translation generates an untranslatable residue which will always be the point 
of departure for new (similarly inadequate and partial) translations. Mediation 
does not lead to univocity, unequivocalness and homogeneity. On the 
contrary, the translational exchange continuously and incrementally adds to 
the potential meaning by actualizing it in ways that are different and 
unpredictable (see Lotman 1990: 405–406; 1985: 86, 121–124).   
The two main properties of Lotmanian translation in cases of untransla-
tability are, therefore, (1) inexhaustibility: since the untranslated residue is 
never eliminated, new and unpredictable texts are always emerging in the 
process of translation, thus deferring the establishment of a final, definitive 
text; and (2) irreversibility: if we translate the text back, or, in other words, if 
we cross the boundary in the other direction, we never regain the original text, 
but always obtain a new one.  
These properties of Lotman’s “translation of the untranslatable” coincide 
significantly with the concept of différance as employed by Derrida to 
deconstruct the transcendental signified. First of all, Derrida, like Lotman, 
clearly relates the theme of différance to a kind of “inadequation” that triggers 
the opening of a border-space: “The liminal space is thus opened up by an 
inadequation between the form and the content of discourse or by an 
incommensurability between the signifier and the signified” (Derrida 2000: 
18).18 It is on the basis of this inadequacy or “difference between the signifier 
and the signified” that Derrida writes of “the impurity of translation” and 
contrasts it to the transparency and unequivocalness of the ideal translation 
operating through the transcendental signified: “We will never have, and in fact 
                                                                                                                                        
may generate “explosions”) to describe dialogue as the contact and collision of different 
systems within the semiotic space.       
18  Lotman writes in a similar vein of the periphery as the place where “our language” is 
“someone else’s language” and “someone else’s language” our own (Lotman 1985: 110; 
Lotman, Uspenskij 1984: 4). 
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have never had, to do with some ‘transport’ of pure signifieds from one 
language to another, or within one and the same language, that the signifying 
instrument would leave virgin and untouched” (Derrida 1981: 20).  
The two conceptual sides brought together by Derrida in his neographism 
correspond to the two main properties of Lotman’s translation of the un-
translatable. As Derrida explains in the essay Différance (republished in Margins 
of Philosophy, 1982: 1–28), the first conceptual side of différance is “deferring” 
(“detouring, delaying, relaying”) the determination of meaning (the continual 
generation of new translations in Lotman’s theory) which implies the 
inexhaustibility of the translational residue. Derrida terms the latter the 
“supplement” or “reserve”.19 The second conceptual side of différance is the 
more common “differing”: “to be not identical, to be other, discernible” – the 
non-self-identity of that which was supposed to be original, and, therefore, its 
non-originary status (in Lotman’s framework, the new “originals” or reverse 
translations).20 
It is important to emphasize that both Lotman and Derrida assert the 
primacy of dialogue and différance (which also means the primacy of plurality 
and numerousness) over sameness and homogeneous unity. In Lotman’s 
words, “[…] dialogue precedes language and gives birth to it. [...] Without the 
semiosphere, language not only does not function, it does not exist” (Lotman 
2005: 218–219). The “semiotic situation” – or “dialogic situation” – precedes 
the instruments of semiosis and the semiotic act (Lotman 2000: 144; see also 
Andrews 2003: 32), insofar as it enables the articulation of the heterogeneous, 
which is essential to any language and communication. 
Derrida is saying fundamentally the same thing when he claims that there is 
no presence before or apart from semiological difference (Derrida 1982: 12). 
                                                          
19  Lotman also uses the concept of “reserve (of indeterminacy)” to describe the 
translational residue (Lotman 2000: 227). 
20  Semiotic non-identity, or difference, is, according to Lotman, the essential pre-
condition of dialogue: “[...] the text to be translated must already contain elements of 
transition to the new language. Otherwise dialogue is impossible” (Lotman 1999: 24; my 
translation – D. M.). It is interesting to observe that, as in différance, translation of the 
untranslatable is characterized by the paradoxical topology of the periphery and also 
introduces a paradoxical temporality in which (future) deferral always deconstructs (past) 
originality. This is why Lotman’s theory of the semiosphere should be viewed in the light of 
his later observations on history (see Lotman 2009). In my dissertation, I provided a 
detailed analysis and some comparison of Derrida’s and Lotman’s concepts of temporality 
(see Monticelli 2008: 88–109).    
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This primacy of différance does not imply origin or beginning; Derrida himself 
often warns against this kind of interpretation. Différance should, on the 
contrary, be conceived as a process which he calls “play” or “production of 
differences”:  
 
Therefore one has to admit, before any dissociation of language and speech, code and 
message, etc. (and everything that goes along with this dissociation) a systematic 
production of differences, the production of a system of differences. (Derrida 1981: 28)  
 
The Lotmanian “dialogic situation” should be understood in the same “pro-
cessual” terms.21   
 
Conclusion 
The logic of Derrida’s and Lotman’s theories is comparable primarily because 
both theoretical constructions are inspired by what I would define as an 
“opening orientation of thought”. Instead of regarding identity-generating 
delimitations as the original function of culture, Lotman and Derrida describe 
them as attempts to efface the constitutive plurality and heterogeneity of the 
semiotic space. A critical revision of the Saussurean conceptual model leads 
them to describe an open totality based on plurality and difference which 
enables the emergence of any particular semiotic system (language, text, 
culture, etc.) and precludes any definite self-enclosure of those systems. 
Whereas Derrida (1997: 7) writes of “archi-writing” and the production of 
differences as “comprehending and exceeding” language,22 the “immersion” of 
any singular system into the semiosphere means, in Lotman’s view, the 
inescapable contact of the system with its  alterity, which is responsible for the 
endless re-articulation of the system itself. 
To conclude, and return to the approach and terminology employed at the 
beginning of this article, we can assert from a reading of Lotman and Derrida 
that before (and, of course, still after) being expelled from any given cultural 
space as a dangerous alterity which must be avoided or, in the worse case, 
destroyed, difference and translation of the untranslatable constituted (and 
                                                          
21  This is also the reason why hypostatizing interpretations of the semiosphere should be 
avoided. The semiosphere is the methodological device Lotman used to represent the 
theoretical primacy of the dialogical situation over the “instruments of semiosis”. 
22  “The secondarity that it seemed possible to ascribe to writing alone affects all signifieds in 
general, affects them always already, the moment they enter the game” (Derrida 1997: 7). 
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continue to constitute) the most essential mechanism by which cultural 
identity continuously constructs and deconstructs itself. 
This is why a comparison of Derrida and Lotman may provide important 
lines of reasoning with which to contest from a theoretical standpoint the 
conservative understanding of cultural identity that is currently being used as 
an ideological justification for social and political conflicts. The intent of this 
article was to sketch the general outlines of a comparison which needs to be 
developed into more detailed analyses concentrating on particular aspects and 
discussing not only the similarities but also the important differences between 
Lotman’s and Derrida’s theories.23   
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Вызов идентичности:  
лотмановский “перевод непереводимого” и   
différance Деррида 
В политическом и социологическом дискурсе, а также в публичной риторике послед-
них десятилетий понятие культуры постепенно стало заменять такие дискредити-
рованные и непригодные более к употреблению понятия, как “раса”, “этнос”,  в не-
которых случаях даже “нация”,  при этом прибегая к  этим понятиям в консервативных 
политических программах. В современном консервативном дискурсе идентичности 
культура понимается как закрытая система с четкими границами, которую надо 
защищать от внешних влияний. Такое понимание культуры служит идеологическим 
основанием для  социально-политических конфликтов.  
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Теории Дерридa и Лотмана служат полезными инструментами для деконструкции 
этого понимания культурной идентичности, которое в последнее время стало 
идеологическим обоснованием социально-политических конфликтов. Фактически, их 
теории исходят из основательной критики типа интернализации самоопределения, 
которое позволило Соссюру выделять и описывать язык как объект лингвистики. Оба 
мыслителя развивают свои теории языка и культуры, исходя из антиструкту-
ралистской позиции, отрицая возможность закрытости и отделения языковых (и 
других семиотических) систем. Автор статьи сравнивает основные компоненты этого 
теоретического направления в трудах Лотмана и Дерридa, сосредотачиваясь на 
понятиях зеркальной структуры, бинаризма, численности, текстуальности и семио-
сферы. На основе сравнения вырисовывается концепция целостности, границы и 
опосредованности, которая подтачивает претензии дискурса идентичности, так как  в 
лотмановской семиосфере и в поле текстуальности 
 
Väljakutse identiteedile:  
Lotmani “tõlkimatuse tõlge” ja  
Derrida différance 
Viimaste kümnendite poliitilises ja sotsioloogilises diskursuses ning avalikus retoorikas on 
kultuuri mõiste järk-järgult hakanud asendama selliseid diskrediteeritud ja kasutamis-
kõlbmatuid mõisteid nagu “rass”, “etnos”, mõnel juhul isegi “rahvus”, pärides samas nende 
mõistete koha konservatiivsetes poliitilistes agendades. Tänapäeva konservatiivses 
identiteedidiskursuses mõistetakse kultuuri kui kindlate piiridega suletud süsteemi, mida 
tuleb kaitsta väliste mõjutuste eest. Selline arusaam kultuurist toimub ideoloogilise 
põhjendusena sotsiaal-poliitilistele konfliktidele.  
Derrida ja Lotmani võrdlev käsitlus pakub olulisi teoreetilisi vahendeid sellise 
kultuurikontseptsiooni kahtluse alla seadmiseks. Mõlemad mõtlejad arendavad oma keele- 
ja kultuuriteooriaid lähtudes antistrukturalistlikust positsioonist, mis eitab keeleliste (ja 
muude semiootiliste) süsteemide suletuse ja eraldumise võimalikkust. Artiklis võrreldakse 
sellise teoreetilise suunitluse peamisi komponente Derrida ja Lotmani töödes, keskendudes 
peeglistruktuuri, binarismi, arvulisuse, tekstuaalsuse ja semiosfääri mõistetele. Võrdlusest 
joonistub terviklikkuse, piiri ja vahendatuse kontseptsioon, mis õõnestab identiteedi-
diskursuse pretensioone, kuna Lotmani semiosfääris ja Derrida tekstuaalsuse väljas 
tasakaalustab igasugust süsteemse sulgemise katset teine, vastupidine ja olemuslikum jõud. 
Lotmani “tõlkimatuse tõlget” ja Derrida différance’i analüüsitakse artiklis kui sarnaseid viise, 
kirjeldamaks süsteemi piiridel toimuvat avavat vahetust. 
Kultuuri (de)konstruktiivne loomus, nii nagu seda kirjeldavad Lotman ja Derrida, 
vastandub katsele näha kultuuri paratamatult antud ja lõplikult fikseeritud identiteetide / 
erinevuste allikana.   
 
 
